Ambassador William Taylor: Ukraine should demonstrate its plan to end the war

Vladyslav Faraponov, Head of the Board of the Institute of American Studies, interviewed Ambassador Taylor at American University Kyiv, where Taylor received the institution's first Honorary Doctorate. He offered insights on critical issues in Ukraine-U.S. relations.

Ambassador Taylor is the Vice President for Europe and Russia at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He brings a distinguished career, including his roles as chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv in 2019 and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009.

— Ambassador Taylor, thank you for your time. It's great to have you here in Kyiv. I want to start by expressing my gratitude on behalf of Ukrainian civil society and the media for all your work, especially your advocacy and efforts to educate the American public about Ukraine. We truly appreciate it.

— Vlad, thank you for your kind words and for having me here. Having this meaningful conversation with you and the Ukrainian people is an honor and a privilege. This is important not only for Ukraine but for the United States as well.

On negotiations and Peace Summit

— During your meeting with the media, I asked about the negotiations and the possibility of a second Peace Summit. You spoke about the need for Ukraine to publicly acknowledge its efforts to explore ways to end the war and the potential impact of this message as we approach fall and winter. Don't you think this should be Ukraine's focus right now, especially with the approaching fall, winter, and possible significant changes after the elections?

— I believe it's crucial for Ukraine to show the world—and also Ukrainians and Russians—that it has a clear vision. Ukraine envisions a just and lasting peace. The first Peace Summit in Switzerland in June 2024 was an initial step. There has been talk about a second one, but it's complicated. The Russians insist they'll only participate if Ukraine surrenders, and Ukraine won't agree to that. But Ukraine needs to demonstrate that it has a plan, knows what it wants, and can build support for that vision both internationally and domestically.

On US policy towards Ukraine

— I would like to ask another important question: What should Ukrainians understand about U.S. policy toward Ukraine and the possible ways this war might end? What issues or concerns should we be aware of?

— First, First, regarding U.S. policy, I want to highlight that the formulation of U.S. policy and its goals in this war have recently shifted. Many Ukrainians will remember President Biden's statement that "the United States would support Ukraine for as long as it takes." Now, this message has evolved, and its meaning has become much stronger.

About a week ago, President Biden and those involved in foreign policy announced a new policy and goal for the United States and Ukraine. The new statement is: "The United States will support Ukraine until Ukraine wins." This marks a significant change and strengthens our commitment and objectives. This is not just about supporting a war indefinitely; it's about supporting Ukraine until victory.

This leads us to your next question about how the war might end. In my conversations with many Ukrainians over the past week, I've encountered considerable debate on this issue. Some argue that "we have to fight until we win," while others say, "We cannot fight forever, so we need to find a way to ensure our safety."

One idea that surfaced was that Ukraine could stop the war if it joined NATO. If Ukraine were part of NATO, Russia would not attack, as Ukraine would be part of a defensive alliance committed to the security of all its members. All 32 NATO members now understand that if Russia ever attacks one, the other 31 nations will be there to support. If Ukraine were in NATO, it would have that same guarantee, providing security. Some Ukrainians I spoke to this week believe that if they could secure a commitment to join NATO, they could seek a way to end the war.

On Biden's legacy in Ukraine

— Why did it take so long for the Biden administration to express a willingness to let Ukraine win? Do you think President Biden's dropping out of the race influenced that?

— I don't know, but it's possible that after stepping aside and allowing Vice President Harris to take up the mantle, President Biden might think, "Ukraine is my legacy. People are going to remember me, Joe Biden, based on how the war in Ukraine ends." He may, I don't know, I haven't spoken with him, but he might be saying, "I want Ukraine to win because if Ukraine wins, my legacy for helping Ukraine win will be strong."

Vice President Harris is also more assertive in some areas than President Biden. So you're right—it's possible that this change, with President Biden stepping down and Vice President Harris stepping in as the next candidate, may have affected U.S. policy toward Ukraine.

On US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement

— This year, the US and Ukraine completed and signed the bilateral security agreement, but many in Ukraine viewed the fact that it has not been ratified by the Congress as a negative development. What would you say to them?

— The Biden administration has not submitted the bilateral security agreement to Congress. Under our Constitution, for a treaty to be approved, it must receive two-thirds of the Senate's vote and does not go to the House of Representatives, only the Senate.

The Biden administration has not yet submitted this bilateral treaty agreement to the Senate. Therefore, it's not binding and not a law. The administration states that it is binding as an executive order, calling it a serious document and treating this bilateral security agreement as a real political commitment from the United States to Ukraine, but not a legal one. I understand that Ukrainians would like to see it strengthened, formalized in law, and submitted to the Senate for ratification. For now, this bilateral security agreement is part of a network of similar agreements with other NATO nations to support Ukraine.

On future vote package for Ukraine

— The US is entering the election stage: What should Ukraine do differently next time the time is up for the next supplemental vote package in the US Congress in terms of advocacy, communication, and the results that can be presented to the US Congress?

— Ukraine did a very good job on this last package. $61 billion is a lot of money, a major success for Ukraine, the United States, and our security. We, the United States, benefit from this $61 billion that will help Ukraine win. It will help Ukraine financially and militarily, and that's important for the United States' security and for European security. So I think the Ukrainians did a good job presenting their argument. And again, there were a lot of Americans who were making the same argument to Congress because they said: "It's in our interest, it is not just for the Ukrainian interest". So, the Americans were making the same case to Congress as the Ukrainians.

On the role of China in the ongoing war

— Recently, the US accused China of giving very substantial help to Russia's war machine. I think the track of China-US relations now is not clearly understood in Ukraine, especially regarding the new terminology that Secretary Blinken used regarding stabilizing the relationship, reopening, and strengthening the high-level Chinese-American channels of communications. He also said that China is helping Russia. How can you connect these two points?

— It's a good question, and if you connect those two points by saying that China should not be supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine. China should not be supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine. If Russia decides to sell weapons to Russia, the United States has made it very clear that we would put the same kind of very harsh sanctions on China that we put on North Korea and Iran.

China, unlike North Korea and Iran, has a significant investment in the West, it sells a lot to Europe and the  United States. Thus, they have a much greater stake in these economic connections and would rather not impose sanctions on them. So far, the Chinese have not sold weapons to Russia.

You're right, we have noticed that the Chinese have sold dual-use equipment and microchips, but they haven't sold weapons.

But then the other part of your question. We are having conversations with the Chinese, and we are talking at the top: President Biden talks to President Xi, our national security advisor Jake Sullivan goes to Beijing, our Secretary of Defense talks to their Defense minister. That's not happening with the Russians because they are international outlaws, they are international pariahs.

The Chinese have the potential to avoid conflict, and I think they would like to avoid conflict. They know that if they get into a fight over Taiwan with the United States, it would be terrible for both sides, so they don't want it.

The Chinese-U.S. relationship can stay stable and not go into conflict. The Russians are fighting a war against their neighbor, which has implications for the rest of Europe and our relations. The Russians are the real enemy and the Chinese are the potential adversary.

On the possible end of the war

— During one of your speeches at Colorado State University last year you mentioned the possibility of a Korea-like scenario for Ukraine. Almost one year has passed. How do you assess the likelihood of this scenario now, and what challenges would Ukraine face in that case if that plan is implemented?

— First, it can't be the suggestion or the idea or the initiative of any foreigner. This has to be a decision by Ukrainians.

The Korea solution is some kind of armistice, a kind of ceasefire. Some Ukrainians don't want a ceasefire, as I talked about earlier. Ukrainians have to decide what scenario, whether it's North Korea/South Korea, whether it's East Germany/West Germany, or whether it continues to fight until they take back all the territory. Those are Ukrainian decisions and Ukrainians will define what victory looks like and then we go back to what the US policy now is: to be with and support Ukraine until they prevail. But Ukrainians define prevail, Ukrainians define victory.

On Trump's administration policy towards Ukraine

— I didn't plan to ask the next question, but at the meeting, you mentioned the so-called "Welles declaration" of 1940 about the non-recognition policy regarding the incorporation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union". Ukraine also has a very similar document: the so-called "Pompeo declaration" in 2018 regarding the similar policy. Unfortunately, I would say that this document is not well-understood or well-communicated in Ukraine. Can you tell what is its practical asset for Ukraine right now and how Ukraine should use it wisely?

— The Welles Declaration states that the United States will never recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Pompeo's declaration states that the United States will never recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea, which may be part of what ends the war.

Again, President Zelensky has said that Ukraine will push the Russians out of some occupied territories militarily and will get back the rest of Ukrainian territory, occupied territory through other means: through diplomatic means, through negotiations, which means that, eventually, Ukraine will take back all of its territory. And we support that. The Pompeo declaration says that we will never recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea. So it could be a part of that agreement.

— Don't you think that it is important to highlight for the team of President Trump, also during the elections, that under his watch, the Secretary of State issued this declaration, and it's his policy as well. Because, when we speak about the possible plan that President Trump is going to offer for Ukraine, everyone is talking about getting territories, about negotiations, but do you have an idea on what will be his red line?

— I don't know, I am not sure if he does. Secretary Pompeo, Mike Pompeo, with some help from Kurt Walker, by the way, has put forward a very strong policy supporting Ukraine. And Secretary Pompeo and the Trump administration previously had a strong position of supporting Ukraine. If former President Trump wins in November, and if he brings Secretary Pompeo into his new administration, Mike Pompeo will remember that he has his declaration, which is the support of Ukraine. But we don't know what Donald Trump will do now. 

On recent Ukrainian successes on the battlefield and the Kursk operation

— How would you assess the withdrawal of Russian warships from Crimea or from the Black Sea?

— A great success for Ukraine. I mean, Ukraine, without a navy, has pushed the Russian Black Sea fleet out of Sevastopol back over into the eastern part of the Black Sea, and has destroyed at least a third of the Black Sea fleet. And we know what happened to the "Moskva". So that is an amazing accomplishment of the Ukrainians with, largely, their weapons and own drones. And that is an indication of what the Ukrainians can do.

Many people were worried about the stalemate before Kursk. But they didn't remember or highlight the important success the Ukrainians had on the sea, in the Black Sea, pushing the Black Sea fleet back.

— My very last question will be: Don't you think that even the conversation about the Kursk operation is also important in terms of Ukrainian advocacy in the United States, in particular, as it gives some fresh air into discussions about strategy and about the war outcome?

— You are absolutely right, Vlad. The Kursk operation demonstrates to Americans, Europeans, Ukrainians, and Russians that Ukraine can fight strong. It has the capability, initiative, imagination, and courage to take this bold, risky step. It has an effect in the United States, and it has built continuous support for Ukraine.

Watch the full version of the interview on the YouTube channel of the "Institute of American Studies":