"Ukraine is nobody's concern except Russia's": How the Kremlin exploits the narrative around its victim's reconstruction

Ivan Valiushko

expert of the National Institute for Strategic Studies

For the past decade, Russia has bragged about enduring sanctions. Putin, a former sambo wrestler, seems to follow the principles of his sport: disguising weakness as strength and using an opponent's strength against them. While his attempts often fall flat, resulting in initiatives as if from Orwell's dystopia like "import substitution" and "territories of advanced development," the concept itself is working. In 2019, the Russian president joked about the US shale revolution, saying, "We'll wait until Americans spend all their money on the technology, and then — bam — we'll buy it cheap." They're still waiting. Meanwhile, Moscow is trying to sell the West its own "product" — the rebuilding of Ukraine — claiming nothing can be restored without forcing Kyiv to comply. Or, alternatively, that there might not even be anything left to rebuild.

With Ukraine — for Ukraine

On November 19, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski shared the outcomes of a Warsaw meeting of foreign ministers from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. This meeting marked 1,000 days since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sikorski stated that Europe's largest economies "are ready to shoulder the military and financial burden of aiding Ukraine, even if US support diminishes." A joint statement from the ministers stressed the "unprecedented scale and variety" of Russia's hybrid threats against NATO and EU countries, alongside a commitment to maintaining and strengthening sanctions. The goal is for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory and pay for the country's post-war recovery.

The presence of Kaja Kallas, the future EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, at the meeting hints at a stable EU-wide stance on these issues.

A few days earlier, Warsaw hosted the 4th ReBuild Ukraine International  Exhibition and Conference. Ukrainian government officials, local leaders, EU representatives, and businesses gathered to discuss post-war reconstruction. The event stood out for its significance, mainly due to the first EU-Ukraine investment conference held within its framework. This conference drew 5,500 participants, including representatives from nearly 500 companies across 32 countries.

Around 100 Ukrainian communities presented their needs and projects to attract investors. Gert Jan Koopman, head of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Enlargement, noted that Ukraine is making noticeable progress in implementing reforms, which has already led to ongoing investments.

Interestingly, the conference included a meeting of 19 countries' special representatives for Ukraine's recovery, including the US, UK, France, Italy, Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Besides investments, discussions covered B2B collaborations, improving the regulatory environment for business, trade development, and boosting the export potential of Ukrainian manufacturing.

One key highlight was a statement by Richard Verma, US Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources and acting special representative for Ukraine's economic recovery. He reaffirmed the US "commitment to a free and independent Ukraine" and stressed the importance of "investing in Ukraine even before the war ends, given the link between defense capability and economic development."

What's noteworthy in these statements? While no billions were pledged, these discussions were about intentions and commitments — financial guarantees. Alongside security assurances, these commitments shape a vision of a post-war future free of war and severe crises. But can we place complete confidence in the words of Sikorski, Koopman, and Verma? Their statements come at one of the most challenging moments of this war — a time when many Western politicians promise quick resolutions but fail to specify how. This leaves room for both Ukrainian and Russian hopes, equally strong yet completely opposing.

Nuclear and corruption pressure

Putin launched this war to either eliminate Ukraine or render it powerless. While there may be middle-ground scenarios, they inevitably lean toward his maximum or minimum objectives. Russia cannot achieve these goals on the battlefield, nor can it abandon them. A frozen conflict — balanced enough to favor everyone except Ukraine and its staunchest allies, like the Baltic states who feel they are the next in line — might be spun as a "victory."

From one perspective, Ukraine remains a sovereign state, retains some access to the sea, and has held onto most of its territory — wins despite the losses. From another, Russia has occupied territories, turned the Sea of Azov into an inland lake, and secured a land corridor to Crimea — victories of its own, even at a higher cost. For the West, halting Europe's bloodiest conflict since World War II, averting a global war, and defending international law might seem like justice — despite specific "nuances" that could be overshadowed by resuming trade with Russia.

Promoting these narratives involves thousands of people and billions of dollars. These efforts also influence the discourse around Ukraine's post-war recovery and reconstruction. Moscow greeted the Ukraine Recovery Conferences in London and Berlin with sarcasm and skepticism, claiming the West pretends to care, caves to emotional appeals, and allocates just enough for corruption to thrive.

Despite such accusations, international partners adopted the "start now" approach to Ukraine's recovery and modernization during the war even before the London conference. There's no public indication that they're abandoning this platform for another, although Russia is actively trying to undermine it. Just as it sends waves of assault troops to one battlefield point, Moscow uses its tried-and-true pressure tactics on Western public consciousness: nuclear threats and accusations of Ukrainian corruption.

Recently, the Kremlin updated its nuclear doctrine. The move appears rushed, likely influenced by the US presidential transition and mounting issues within Russia's economy. However, the intent is clear: transitioning from the narrative of a "besieged fortress" to a "Death Star" needs creating a vacuum for its proverbial laser. This scorched-earth approach ensures a clear, limitless horizon. This underpins threats to deploy nuclear weapons if military exercises take place near Russia's borders or if NATO forces approach them. Interestingly, this predominantly and exclusively targets Ukraine, as Putin remains unbothered by NATO's expanded borders following Finland's accession.

The doctrine aligns with the Kremlin's strategy for Ukraine's capitulation. To avoid the threat of a nuclear strike, Kyiv is expected to abandon its NATO aspirations and deny entry to foreign troops, even for training purposes. This selective approach undermines the doctrine's plausibility but effectively exploits the fear of nuclear escalation, which has paralyzed Ukraine's allies over the past three years. The Kremlin loses nothing by inserting a few additional clauses into an old document.

Meanwhile, alongside mocking Western efforts to rebuild Ukraine, Russia systematically weaponizes isolated incidents to paint a picture of systemic failure — the generalization method. A recent example coincided with the Warsaw exhibition and the Ukraine Recovery Conference. Russian media widely circulated a France24 report titled "Corruption looms over Ukraine's massive reconstruction effort." The article alleged that French company Neo-Eco abandoned a project to rebuild residential housing outside Kyiv due to corruption within Hostomel's Military-Civil Administration.

Russia's self-proclaimed truth advocates eagerly embraced this narrative despite its murky origins, both in the French original and Russian interpretations — here, here, and here. The exposure of Ukrainian corruption is attributed to "the project director of the French company Neo-Eco, Bart Gruyaert." Let's do some fact-checking:

1. While the article cited AFP (Agence France-Presse) as the primary source, no such report exists on AFP's official platform.
2. Bart Gruyaert, the supposed whistleblower, works for Neo-Eco—not for its French branch but for its Ukrainian partner company. Neo-Eco specializes in waste recycling and eco-design and continues its projects in Ukraine.
3. A French employee of a Ukrainian firm cannot represent French business interests. Yet, Russian media sensationalized the story with headlines implying "French firms refuse to rebuild Ukraine."
4. The claims have seen no traction in Ukrainian media, except for social media posts referencing Russian outlets.
5. The alleged events occurred between July and September 2023, with no developments in 2024.

Why is outdated information being framed as breaking news? Likely to exert pressure for the sake of pressure. Amid potential shifts in US military support under a new president, Europe's wavering security policies, North Korean troop involvement and rumors of this involvement growing, gradual squeezing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the positions they hold, and daily drone and missile threats, Russia seeks to project the certainty of its victory.

This disinformation aims to convince Ukraine's international partners of the futility of supporting its reconstruction under Russia's strikes and in a climate of alleged rampant corruption. The Kremlin also feigns concern for foreign taxpayers, suggesting funds should not be allocated or invested only under "peaceful conditions." Both options inherently involve a ceasefire, each with troubling implications:

In one instance, Western donors pressured by their concerned voters might pressure Ukraine into abandoning contested territories to rebuild others. Such ultimatums, though not explicitly worded this way, essentially advocate for capitulation — accepting the loss of land in exchange for peace.

The other option is the Kremlin's proposal to rebuild Ukraine as its own territory post-victory. This idea is in the reprints of the French revelation — namely, that the pace of recovery and return to peaceful life in the "liberated" territories is higher than in those controlled by Kyiv. Therefore, all it takes is to force Ukraine to cease fire, and internally displaced persons will immediately start returning, voting with their feet for a better standard of living.

Until November 20, one could only speculate about which lever the Kremlin might use to strengthen its position. However, the panic and the temporary closure of Western embassies in Kyiv due to a possible missile strike shed some light on the situation. Perhaps this is merely adherence to safety protocols, but such a reaction on the 1,001st day of the war is surprising. It also fuels a conspiracy theory about Moscow allegedly warning Washington of some particular danger.

For now, it is difficult to label this as outright blackmail: Russia lacks extra arguments and effective means to influence decisions on Ukraine's reconstruction. Apart from large-scale international events, Ukraine can count on initiatives like €10 million from Lithuania for urgent infrastructure repairs or €200 million from Italy to restore the power grid, along with a related conference next year.

While Ukraine will find ways to tackle its corruption, the world must reassess its approach to Russia's nuclear threats. Yielding to the fear of their potential use could result in ending this war with Ukraine's capitulation, followed by ceding half of Europe while remaining forever trapped in this precarious cycle.