Russian forces likely preparing for urban combat to advance on Ukrainian frontline cities in winter campaign – ISW

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) believe that the Russian army in the winter of 2024-2025 will likely focus on capturing frontline Ukrainian cities and urban battles, trying to offset the advantages of Ukrainian drones and possible limitations of Russian armored vehicles.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that.

The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the famous Telegram channel Mikhail Zvinchuk said in an interview with the Russian-language diaspora channel RTVI on November 16 that Russian troops would try to concentrate combat operations in "populated areas, not in open fields" in the winter of 2024-25, and cited Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove as examples of cities where Russia will prioritize an offensive this winter.

Zvinchuk claimed that Russian troops were preparing to launch a battle for Pokrovsk and would approach Pokrovsk from the south and southeast.

ISW experts emphasized that Zvinchuk is a well-known voice in the Russian information space, has connections to the Kremlin, and may possess insider information about Russia's goals on the front and the campaign plan.

"Russian forces have recently made advances into eastern Kupyansk and central Chasiv Yar, and such advances may be part of a concerted effort to advance into frontline cities in preparation for offensive operations in Winter 2024-2025," the report reads.

According to ISW analysts, capturing Kupiansk or Chasiv Yar would significantly affect the front's positioning and potentially jeopardize key Ukrainian defensive positions in those areas. The recent Russian progress into these cities would pose a greater, though not imminent, threat to Ukrainian defenses in both directions.

Zvinchuk also argued that Russian forces would also seek to increase their combat capabilities in the winter, in particular, the capabilities of Russian drones due to the importance of the "drone war."

Zvinchuk noted that Russian forces have an artillery advantage over Ukrainian forces but that Russian forces cannot advance through Ukrainian drones currently. He suggested that better-trained and equipped forces would be able to confront Ukrainian drone operators more effectively.

ISW has previously noted that the Russian Defense Ministry appears to be trying to centralize control over unofficial Russian drone units, and Zvinchuk's comments likely relate to this ongoing effort and indicate that the Ministry of Defense may intend to step up these efforts in the winter.

Ukrainian drones continue to play a critical role in deterring Russian mechanized maneuvers and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's human resources and logistical constraints.

The Russian military leadership might see urban combat as more suitable compared to their current infantry fighting style because tall buildings can offer better protection for Russian soldiers against Ukrainian drone operators, unlike trees in open areas.

Russian military leaders might also favor fighting in urban areas to avoid the extra expenses associated with moving through rural fields and towns, which strain their armored vehicles and reserves.

For reference:

• The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within the Kursk region.
• Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.
• North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited.
• Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding complete Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Still, a Kremlin-affiliated military blogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.
• Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17, calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• Russian military bloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.

It should be noted that following the United States, France, and Britain permitted long-range strikes by Ukraine's armed forces on Russian territory.