Ukraine unable to counterattack for another six months, but West’s aid could turn the tide – ISW

Western partners' support can assist Ukraine's armed forces in countering Russia's artillery superiority, gaining an advantage in battle, and altering the war's course.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported this.

The report mentions that recent US intelligence assessments emphasize Ukraine's actions in developing alternative and unconventional capabilities in response to Russia's advantage in human resources and technology and its ongoing reliance on security aid from the West.

On August 15, the US Department of Defense released a quarterly review of US military aid to Ukraine. The report contained various assessments from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA's intelligence findings align with readily observable trends and events, although they were analyzed with a focus on static rather than dynamic battlefield conditions.

According to the DIA, recent US military aid to Ukraine "almost certainly" will not be enough to help the Ukrainian army match or surpass Russia's artillery superiority, which is estimated at 10,000 artillery rounds per day.

Ukrainian military officials have consistently raised concerns about Ukrainian artillery shortages following significant delays in US aid in winter 2023-2024 and spring 2024. Ukrainian officials have previously acknowledged the impact of artillery restrictions on Ukraine's defensive and offensive capabilities, particularly in the Donetsk region.

"Destructive Russian shelling and glide [guided – ed.] bomb strikes appear to be a fundamental aspect of the Kremlin's theory of victory in Ukraine, which posits that Russian forces can continue slow, grinding advances aided by razing Ukrainian settlements to the ground regardless of Russian manpower losses and premised on the assumption that Russian forces can deprive Ukraine of the ability to contest the theater-wide initiative in perpetuity," the ISW report says.

Meanwhile, the Institute for the Study of War has observed that Ukrainian troops have shown impressive proficiency in developing and implementing alternative and asymmetric tactics. Specifically, they have utilized long-range drone strikes to mitigate the impact of Russia's superior artillery capabilities and defend against their mechanized and infantry attacks, often with greater success than their own less advanced systems.

ISW recalled that at the end of July 2024, Ukraine's armed forces successfully defended against a series of large-scale Russian mechanized attacks in the west of the Donetsk region with drone strikes and limited artillery support. Russian military bloggers warned of the threat of targeted strikes by Ukrainian drones with a first-person view (FPV ) along the entire front line in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces, the Institute continues, also use long-range strikes on Russian military facilities and oil depots that supply military equipment to complicate Russian logistics, force the aggressor country to redeploy air defense assets, and undermine the Russian oil and gas industry.

"The most recent allotment of US aid to Ukraine is undoubtedly insufficient to address the ongoing artillery disparity between Russian and Ukrainian forces, and asymmetric means are not a replacement for artillery and other conventional means, but the US and wider Western alliance remain capable of addressing Ukraine's constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance," the ISW report says.

The Pentagon's intelligence agency (DIA) also estimates that Ukraine "probably" remains capable of continuing defensive operations but will not be capable of conducting large-scale counteroffensive operations for at least the next six months.

Recently, the Institute for the Study of War assessed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces cannot conduct separate, decisive, victorious operations. Instead, they must conduct numerous successful operations with limited operational objectives that can collectively achieve strategic goals.

ISW still believes that Ukrainian forces could carry out smaller counterattacks and targeted offensives to free territory without dealing with the difficulties of more extensive operations. This is considering Western countries' ongoing delays and uncertainty in providing additional military aid to Ukraine.

The Institute remembered that in the past few months, Ukrainian forces have launched a series of localized counterattacks in the northern part of Kharkiv region and towards Kreminna (bordering Luhansk and Donetsk regions). This suggests that Ukraine's armed forces attempt to regain control in some front areas.

In addition, Ukrainian forces managed to launch a local offensive operation in the Kursk region and intercept the operational initiative on this part of the front, which diverted Russian troops from other, less-priority areas of the front in Ukraine.

According to ISW, Ukrainian officials have recognized the potential diversion of Russian forces from less crucial regions of the front as a primary aim of their incursion into the Kursk region. These tactics may compel Russia to leave some of these areas open to subsequent counterattacks by Ukraine.

The Institute for the Study of War maintains that Ukrainian forces can take control of the battlefield and ultimately set the stage for both small and large-scale counterattacks if they receive timely and sufficient security support from Western sources.

"The US and the international coalition supporting Ukraine retain significant influence over Ukrainian warfighting capabilities, and Western decisions about Ukraine's resourcing levels and rules of engagement regarding Russian military targets can substantially alter the trajectory of the war," ISW concluded.

ISW key findings as of August 21:

• The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing maintaining the initiative in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region.
• Putin notably appears to be demanding that Russia defeat Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk region without sacrificing the stability of his regime, deprioritizing the offensive in eastern Ukraine, or firing his incompetent but loyal lieutenants. The results of such a strategy are too early to forecast.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout the Kursk region salient on August 21 and have made additional marginal advances.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of Chechnya for the first time in 13 years on August 20, likely to shift domestic focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region and posture normalcy and stability.
• Recent US intelligence assessments highlight Ukraine's efforts to develop alternative and asymmetric capabilities in the face of Russian human resources and materiel advantages and Ukraine's continued dependence on Western security assistance.
• Ukraine continues efforts to attrit Russia's air defense and aviation capabilities.
• Russian authorities may have attempted to block Telegram and other non-Russian internet communications services on August 21.
• The Russian government reportedly supports a bill allowing Russian authorities to draw up administrative protocols against Russian citizens who violate Russian law while living abroad.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Qiang discussed deepening bilateral economic and trade relations in Moscow on August 21.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and northeast of Robotyne.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to create Cossack organizations in occupied Ukraine, likely to build out Russia's military reserves and law enforcement bodies in occupied Ukraine.

It should be added that as of August 20, Ukraine's armed forces control 93 settlements in the Kursk region and more than 1,260 square kilometers of the territory of the Russian Federation.