Russian army unable to conduct summer offensive due to resource constraints – ISW

The Russian military is still conducting sporadic and impulsive mechanized attacks, which probably reflects their current offensive capabilities. However, due to limitations in resources and personnel, the Russian Federation is unlikely to be able to conduct a new summer offensive operation.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported this.

American analysts previously noted that it is difficult for Russian troops to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and tend to act in "pulses" in different front areas.

The intensity of one sector decreases when the intensity of the other sector increases. Throughout the summer, the occupiers periodically carried out mechanized assaults on the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka fronts in the Donetsk region. Attacks to the west and southwest of Donetsk have recently intensified.

Changing priorities

Military experts draw attention to the fact that the Russian army command transferred parts of the 90th Tank Division of the Central Military District from Avdiivka to the southwest of Donetsk, which indicates a change in priorities after the failures in the Avdiivka area.

According to ISW, Russian forces are likely to send additional mechanized forces to the area during the summer of 2024 to exploit Ukrainian defense weaknesses and achieve a limited territorial advance.

Analysts note that Russian troops previously planned to seize the remaining territories of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions in the summer of 2024.

However, it is likely that Russia changed these plans once the US military aid reached Ukraine in April 2024. The Russian command may portray limited tactical offensives in western Donetsk, such as cutting off the Vuhledar-Kostiantynivka highway, as a significant triumph.

"According to ISW's estimates, Russian troops are probably trying to capture Kostiantynivka and cut the T-0524 Vuhledar-Kostiantynivka highway, forcing the Ukrainian military to retreat from this area," experts emphasized.

Losses of armored vehicles

ISW also believes that the Russian command's readiness to continue limited tactical gains in exchange for significant losses of armored vehicles can become a serious burden on the Russian army in the long term.

Currently, there is enough equipment to carry out periodic assaults. Still, the question arises whether the occupiers have sufficient reserves of armored vehicles to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations on several areas of the front and compensate for increased equipment losses.

The Economist estimated that in the first two years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armored vehicles. According to the editors, the Russian troops will probably go on the defensive next year, as their stocks of Soviet weapons and equipment are running out.

ISW key findings as of July 30:

• North Korea may be expanding the volume and variety of weapons it is providing to Russia.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to corral Russian information space actors onto social media sites that the Kremlin can more directly influence to control their rhetoric directly, prompting some backlash from Russian ultranationalist military bloggers and opposition journalists.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Vozy, Kursk region, on the night of July 29 to 30.
• The Russian government continues to support educational programs on "information and hybrid warfare" to train Russians to conduct and counter information operations, use open-source research methodology, and effectively analyze and counter hybrid threats for the Kremlin.
• Russian officials and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) representatives are advocating for the Kremlin to codify a state ideology premised on the idea that the sovereign Ukrainian state should not exist into Russian federal law.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Authorities in St. Petersburg have joined other Russian regional authorities in increasing financial incentives for recruits to sign military service contracts.

For reference:

Earlier, analysts at ISW pointed out that the Russian army likely doesn't have enough soldiers and equipment to make a fast attack. Specifically in the directions of Toretsk and Donetsk, the occupiers are continually pushing along the entire front line to prevent the Ukrainian Defense Forces from taking control of the battlefield.

In July 2024, the Russian ground forces continued their offensive in the central part of the Donetsk region.