The American magazine TIME recently named Yuliya Navalnaya one of the world's leaders, "a symbol of democratic values" and "a courageous fighter for them." The profile in the prestigious publication officially places the widow of Alexei Navalny, a politician who had died in prison, as another figurehead of the Russian opposition in the eyes of the West. This occasion has made us wonder what exactly Russians in exile who call themselves the opposition are fighting for if they fight at all.
The Russian "opposition" is little like the traditional standard of opposition in democratic countries. It is a scattered and ununited group of individuals, most of whom moved to the West after Russia unleashed its full-scale war against Ukraine two years ago.
Since February 2022, Russian emigrates have tried to unite into one movement but generally failed, so their impact on their country and the war against Ukraine remains to be seen. According to the study by the Ukrainian Civil Network OPORA, the Russian "opposition" includes three main groups:
Despite their shared opposition to Putin, these groups differ in their activities and frequently clash over strategies for Russia's future.
In the article "Is Contemporary Russian Opposition a Myth or Reality?" Ukrainian researcher Natalia Kononenko states that Russia had a chance to build a transparent political system with real opposition in the late 1990s, but Russian society didn't take this opportunity. Instead, Russians, who traditionally side with strong leadership, chose Vladimir Putin, who sidelined liberals, strengthened his grip on power, and allowed only token rivals.
Today, amid the full-scale war, the opposition has no presence in Russian governing bodies. Anti-Putin figures who could take to the streets to protest the regime, look for supporters in the regions or work inside Russia as partisans to disrupt the war machine left their country. According to Ukrainian political scientist Yevhen Popov, the issue with the Russian opposition is that it has no connection with its society. It did not build a grassroots movement or a single initiative with a broad regional network of activists in a country of 140 million people.
Lacking real power, Russian dissidents are not candidates for future leadership and can not influence events in Russia. An advisor to Ukrainian President Zelensky's office, Mykhailo Podoliak, encapsulated the idea, "A Russian opposition doesn't exist; there's a dissident movement that has no impact and lacks ambition."
In our previous article, "Why is every Russian responsible for the war? Ukrainians answer," we touched on the topic of collective responsibility of the Russian people for the war and why it is wrong to use the term "Putin's war" to talk about the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine. The Russian "opposition" in exile, often challenged by the fact that it was complicit in the totalitarian regime in its country and the war it led to, denies its fault and insists that most Russians do not support the invasion of Ukraine.
Even Russian political prisoners tend to blame only Putin and overlook the broader societal issues in Russia. Ilya Yashin, a political activist who was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison for spreading fake news about the Russian army and released in the prisoners swap between Russia and the West in August 2024, argued in a piece for TIME magazine that ordinary Russians were resisting Putin and should not be held accountable for the war.
British researcher and author of the book Russia's War Jade McGlynn, who studied Russian society under Putin, points out that some Russian opposition leaders promote the view that "this is only Putin's war" and "Russians are victims" to appeal to Western audiences and find money for their groups. However, their arguments simplify the concept of dictatorship and downplay the widespread support for imperialist policies.
Some Western media and Russian opposition figures suggest that Russians are victims, too, comparable to Ukrainians. According to author Jade McGlynn, this narrative is problematic and unacceptable because it soft-pedals Ukrainian suffering and clears Russians of accountability. Still, some dissidents in Western capitals find this helpful for their future political careers.
Often, anti-Putin politicians portray Russian migrants as "good Russians" who also became victims of the war against Ukraine. They frequently criticize restrictions for "good Russians" living abroad because they believe leaving Russia equates to opposition to Putin's regime. According to the OPORA think tank, this self-imposed exile is questionable as a political statement if the person distances themselves from any issues related to Russia and its war and may continue to spread imperialist narratives and Kremlin propaganda.
Russian opposition often refuses to acknowledge that the invasion of Ukraine stems from deeply rooted imperialism in the Russian people. The OPORA study analyzed the public social media accounts of Russian political activists in exile and found that they avoid discussing how to shift away from an imperialistic mindset in post-war Russia. They also don't talk about the ways to decolonize Russia or their country giving up nuclear weapons.
Even those who criticize Russian aggression and Putin may still hold onto the same expansionist views. Anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, known worldwide and praised by Western media and governments as an opposition leader, was criticized many times for nationalist statements. In 2014, he did not condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea and suggested that it wouldn't be returned to Ukraine. The recently deceased Navalny often talked about the "brotherhood" of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, pushing Russian imperialism rhetoric. His ally, Vladimir Milov, a former Russian energy minister, has also expressed the same views, advocating for a strong and strategically positioned Russia with energy dominance and its influence over neighboring regions.
Russian opposition has made little change to the current situation in their country and has been stagnant in actions and statements. A striking example is the reaction to the Russian presidential elections in March 2024. Ukraine's Institute of Mass Information (IMI) monitored and analyzed statements by opposition leaders on the eve of the polls. They found that most shared passivity and despair and shifted responsibility for Russia's future to someone else.
According to IMI, most of the time, they suggested holding silent protests to show that people were dissatisfied with the elections and Putin's new term in office. They called on all Russians who oppose the current Kremlin regime to come to polling stations at noon on March 17, 2024, "to see each other and realize they are not alone." This initiative was dubbed "Noon Against Putin" and was supported by Maxim Reznik, head of the Saint Petersburg branch of the "Yabloko" party, Yulia Navalnaya, widow of Alexei Navalny, and more.
Western governments have invested time, money, and overly optimism in Russian opposition movements and figures like Alexei Navalny. Many even created a "cult of Navalny," viewing him as a symbol of Russian democracy and an alternative to Putin. After his death, his replacement and widow, Yuliya, who had already met with US President Biden and European leaders, became the center of their attention. This approach to making Russia democratic has proved to be ineffective.
Amid the full-scale war approved and even cheered by the Russian people, dissidents with many flaws and problematic views are not the answer to achieving peace and stopping the Kremlin's regime. The only possible approach to weakening or destroying the Russian dictatorship is for Ukraine to defeat the aggressor on the battlefield. At the moment, the Ukrainian army is the true opposition that has a chance to change the situation, but not without Western support.
For now, the only Russians who help Ukraine in the fight are volunteer fighters from the "Liberty of Russia" Legion, the Russian Volunteer Corps, and the Siberian Battalion. Time will tell if they are genuine supporters of Ukraine and have the potential to change their country.
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